PAM 2man Authentication Plugin for Unix and Linux

Our focus on the ongoing, ever-changing threats and attacks from outside our networks should not distract us from protecting against threats from within—especially the low-likelihood, but high-consequence, insider threat posed by privileged, trusted users. The recent National Security Agency (NSA) information leak incidents have prompted immediate focus on the topic of internal security. In these events, an employee with privileged access disclosed sensitive or classified data to the public without permission [1], prompting government and non-government organizations to review their internal security controls and reassess their effectiveness in protecting against insider threats.

Despite the risk of insider attacks, most security products do not offer protection against these attacks [2]. Moreover, identifying the source of internal adversarial activities is a challenging task [2]. How can an organization protect sensitive or classified information from malicious insider attacks? In response to questions posed by reporters from several news outlets, the director of the NSA, K. Alexander, announced that a “ two-man rule” would be instituted on NSA systems to prevent a recurrence of similar events [3]. The announcement triggered questions about the feasibility and effectiveness of implementing a two-man rule.

This research and development study aims to answer those two questions:

1) Is a two-man rule feasible in a production environment?

2) How can a two-man rule be enforced?

Our implementation of a PAM plugin for two-man authentication can be found on our github page here:

https://github.com/Argonne-National-Laboratory/Pam-2man-Auth

Defining a “Two-man” Rule

Two-man rule (also known as two-person rule, two-man authentication, or two-person authentication) is a security control that prohibits independent, single-person access to critical data, applications, and computer systems. The rule requires two authorized individuals who are in constant view of each other to concurrently login to the system before access can be granted. This approach ensures that accidental or intentional malicious activities cannot be performed without the consent of the second person. A literature search returned no examples of designs or implementations of two-man authentication. The work presented in this paper bridges the gap between concept and implementation by demonstrating the feasibility and effectiveness of an enforceable two-man rule in Linux-based systems.

Two-man Authentication Proof-of-concept

This proof-of-concept demonstration addresses the idea of requiring a second set of credentials to access sensitive or classified data and/or change critical configurations on secure systems. To accomplish this, we developed a plugin using the PAM system, the system used for user authentication and security on Linux systems [5]. PAM can authenticate users in a variety of ways, but most typically it uses passwords.

PAM allows applications to employ different user-authentication methods using a stacked plugin architecture. This means that plugins, such as the two-man authentication plugin developed in this study, do not require knowledge of the underlying authentication type of a specific application. In other words, such a plugin could be used with password authentication as easily as with biometric authentication, as long as the other components of the PAM stack and the application itself supports a given plugin.

For our proof of concept, the plugin was added to a Linux system for use with sudo. Sudo is a console program used to assume temporary administrative privileges that are required to execute a program, access or modify a file, or for other specific functions. We used sudo in our proof of concept because it is the most commonly used method for obtaining elevated privileges to execute commands in a Unix/Linux environment, making it ideal for enforcing two-man authentication.

Sudo, by default, uses PAM as its method for authenticating a user’s system access credentials and then uses its own internal method to evaluate whether or not a user is allowed elevated privileges for the given command. However, a PAM plugin cannot decide whether to permit the sudo-user to perform actions; the permission-to-execute decision must be performed separately. To decide whether to grant permission, our implementation used a secondary authentication method for our second user, namely, a system “group.” This secondary “group” provides additional security because it enforces a hierarchy of permissions in the Bob (an administrator) and Alice (an authorizer) example, as shown in Fig. 1, using apache2ctl, a common Web system management tool. Fig. 1 shows the details of our proof of concept.

This implemented design permits both granular control over execution permissions and hierarchical, supervisory control to ensure management (authorizer) oversight of the activities performed by the administrator. This fine-grained (per system function) and oversight control is defined by group memberships. Specific authorization to perform functions is granted via sudo’s internal authentication scheme. Managerial authorization is granted through the “sudo-authorizer” group membership. A person could be in the administrator group, the authorization group, or both. Membership in one group does not imply or grant membership in the other group:

1) A managing administrator can have authorization to perform functions (sudoer) and authorize others to perform actions (sudo-authorizer);

2) A security manager can have no authorization to perform actions (non sudoer) but have permission to authorize administrative actions (sudo-authorizer); and

3) A system administrator can perform functions (sudoer) but not authorize others to perform actions (non sudo-authorizer).

Discussion and Conclusion

The two-man authentication plugin described here was designed for use with sudo, a primary Linux/Unix-based tool for granting permission to privileged operations. Permission to use other programs could also be controlled using the plugin.

This proof-of-concept demonstration was successful: two non-root user logins and corresponding passwords were required before permission to execute was granted. The requirement for not allowing root users prevents a single user from subverting the check for the second authorizing user. The plugin was also successfully tested using PAM’s fingerprint authentication module for password-less biometric authentication.

Additional security is obtained by creating a supervisory role for the second person, who not only witnesses, but also authorizes, the actions of the primary person (e.g., the system administrator). This limits the opportunity for collusion between two regular administrators and requires that any administrator obtain the permission of a supervisor, who authorizes and witnesses their actions.


This post was written by: Mike Thompson & Victoria Kisekka

References
  1. Gellman, B.; A. Blake; G. Miller. 2013. “Edward Snowden comes forward as source of NSA leaks.” The Washington Post [modified 2013; cited July 31, 2013]. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html.
  2. Ragan, S. “Preventing a Snowden-Style Security Breach.” 2013. Slashdot [modified 2013; cited August 20, 2013]. Available from: http://slashdot.org/topic/bi/preventing-a-snowden-style-security-breach.
  3. Drew, C.; S. Sengupta. 2013. “N.S.A. Leak Puts Focus on System Administrators.” The New York Times [modified 2013; cited August 20, 2013]. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/technology/nsa-leak-puts-focus-on-system-administrators.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
  4. Brower, H.H.; S.W. Lester; M.A. Korsgaard; B.R. Dineen. 2009. “A Closer Look at Trust between Managers and Subordinates: Understanding the Effects of Both Trusting and Being Trusted on Subordinate Outcome.” Journal of Management. March 1, 2009; 35(2):327–347.
  5. Lackey, E.D. “Using Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM).” Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6. Raleigh: Red Hat; 2011.